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Abstract 
 
Security of Information Systems concentrates on the collective efforts of all institutions to produce markedly 
secured Information systems to help deal with the threats or problems of Identity management within and outside 
the banking institution. Identity Management (IDM)” refers to the analysis of procedures of utilizing technologies, 
models/methods, standards/mechanisms in order to manage essential information in the institution’s network 
about the identity of all users, and control access to Bank resources. In this project, apart from the design 
implementation and  analysis,  emphasis was also  placed on the Identity Management(IDM), which  guarantees 
the Identity and Integrity of every registered users in  the Network in order to apply appropriate access policy, 
deliver visibility into Network activity, and secure the local, centralized, distributed,  and web/globalizes 
management of remote devices, while providing Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting functionality 
across the institution’s  Network devices. The Security of information systems and the need to have an effective 
management system in any organization cannot be overemphasized, because any attempt to undermine this 
laudable objective in any organization could obviously lead to an array of conflicts/crises within the organization. 
Essentially, this project is focussed on a design of a security requirements, analysis, and policy formulation in 
organization with a bias in the banking industry. Availability of such model can help management to formulate 
policy in terms of the security of operations in the system. In particular, the policy spells out the various 
authentication and authorization actions to be carried out by clients and personnel in the bank. However, there 
are strings of threats such as identity theft, “phishing mail”, false accounts, fraudulent loans, wire fraud, credit 
card fraud, etc associated to the system. In other to have effective system in place, the system must be such that 
is capable of detecting these threats before they are carried out. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This project is focused on a design of Security requirements, analysis, and policy formulation in a Bank. The 
essence of this design is to enable the Bank to design an appropriate Security Network, which will help 
guarantee the security of Information Systems in the Bank. In the course of this project, the following were 
taken into consideration: Assets in the bank, the operations of each staff, customers and non customers in 
terms of authentication and authorization policy; role allocation policy, and threat policy. The confidentiality 
policy, as well as the availability of the system was also of paramount importance to the design.  We also 
placed emphasis on the threats facing the security system; such as access by unauthorised persons either 
by way of identity theft or by obtaining someone else’s password, and attempting to alter information that 
could create serious crisis in the institution; as well as the integrity of the security system. In view of this 
development, the design was built on the premise that Identity management is a key to the implementation 
design.  Based on this scenario, this paper is adumbrated as follows: Apart from the introduction, Section II  
contains a brief  literature review on the subject matter; Section III  contains the Methodology used in this 
project,   and a description of the various assets in the bank:  personal details of customers, personal details 
of staff, non customers, account details, etc. In this section, the operations and roles with respect to the 
assets were clearly spelt out.  Section IV discusses the potential threats to the security system, and the 
vulnerable spots in the system were identified. Section V contains highlights and discussion on 
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Authentication of users; while Section VI discusses the Authorization policy of the system. Section VII 
discusses the issue of confidentiality; section VIII discusses the integrity status of the system; while Section 
IX discusses the availability of the system; and section X explains the audit procedure of the system. And 
section XI contains an explanation on how the system detects and reacts to threats; while, Section XII brings 
the analysis to a close with a concluding remark. 
 
2. Security Systems in Organizational Context 
 
The performance of any security system in any organization depends highly on the level of care put in place 
during the design. Security of Information Systems has therefore culminated into tough web of technology 
concepts and standards. And there seems to be no end in sight in terms of standard or consistency, not even 
a single organization. At the moment the issue appears to be beyond software and system users. The errors 
are only discovered only after the damage has been done to the system. “The only true security system is 
one that is powered off, cast in a block of concrete and sealed in a lead-lined room with armed guards-and 
even then there are still doubts”-(Gene Spafford 2007 : 291). ISO 27001, an information security 
management standard and certification program encompasses a set of information security requirements and 
it helps to reassures customers, employees, and suppliers that information security is of paramount 
importance for the organization. The organization on its part owes it a point of duty to establish a standard 
security system to deal with information security threats and issues. 
Accordingly, ISO27001 is deeply associated to all classes of organizations, and is generally applied for 
certification purposes. Once the organization meets the standard of ISO 27001 requirements, the security 
features is often certified by an external registrar. Broadly speaking, a lot of IT managers do not have the 
required coherent platform and genuine methodology for achieving enterprise security. A security plan that 
includes technology, personnel, and policies would be a much better approach to developing an organization 
security strategy (Hazari, 2005). Essentially, the building of a security model requires a clear understanding 
of the security functional requirements of the organization, and a standard security policy strategy (FIP 
Standard, 2004; FIP Standard, 2006; NIS Special publication, 2002; NIS Bulletin, 2003).  Accordingly, the 
literature suggests that different levels were adopted by researchers to examine access control requirements. 
Foremost in their approach is the threat analysis-based approach; and it has been found to be very essential 
as studied intensively by researchers (Debar et al., 2006; Thomson and Von Solms, 1998; ; Whitman, 2004). 
The second approach is the evaluation-criteria based. The emergence of this approach over time gained 
immense popularity among researchers. And this framework has also been adopted by the US department of 
defence; as well as the European Union. As a result of this development, it is widely known as the common 
criteria (ISO/IEC, 20050).  Consequently, this school of thought have recommended that this become a basis 
for every security model. However, to formally evaluate any security system, an evaluation methodology with 
a set of security requirements is required in order to define the functionality of the security system. Adequate 
care for the existing technology expertise may well overwhelm an information company, irrespective of 
position and size. The bottom line therefore should be a regular assessment of risk in order to ensure that the 
goal of achieving a genuine security system is not a mirage.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
The methodology in this project involves a design of a set of potential security procedures and polices within 
the Banking environment. Thereafter, the project will discuss the potential threats to its operations and 
unauthorised access to the customer’s information and electronic funds 
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3.1 Assets of the bank 
 
In this section, we shall discuss in brief about the assets we have identified within the bank with respect to 
security issues. 
 
Table 1 Assets: Customer Authentication Table 
 
Customer- ID Password
C0001 abcdefgh
C0002 Robinson
 
This table is used to authenticate the customers when they login via the Internet, using the customer ID and 
its associated password.  
 
Table 2   Assets: Customer Details Table  
 
Customer ID Name Address Telephone Status Security Question 
C0001 Mr S. Robinson Epson 123456789 Active Dog = Feed 
 
This table contains customer details associated with the customer ID. The status field identified above is 
used to mark the customer’s entry and inform the bank as to how to interact with the customer.  
 
Table 3   Assets: Account – Holder Table 
 
Customer ID Account ID
C0001 A1001
C0001 A0002
 
This table contains entries for all the actual accounts a customer has with the bank. It maps both customers 
to accounts and to customer. 
 
Table 4 Assets: Account Authentication Table  
 
Account ID PIN
A1001 1234 
 
This table is used to authenticate a customer as he/she  interacts  with a specific account that he/she own, 
using both the account ID and its associated PIN 
 
Table 5 Assets: Accounts Table 
 
Account ID Account Type Date Opened Balance Status 
A1001 Visa 01/01/06 -200.00 Active 
A0002 Loan 01/02/06 -7000.00 Active 
 
This table contains account details associated with the account ID, which then maps a specific customer.  
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Table 6 Asset: Account Transaction Table  
 
Account- ID Transaction-ID
A0001 710
A0002 711
 
The table maps transactions to accounts and accounts to transactions. 
 
Table 7 Assets: Transaction Table  
 
Transaction- ID Date Amount Location Status 
710 25/03/2006 100.00/- Stratford Active 
712 10/12/2006 500.00/- Forest Gate Monitored 
 
This table contains all transactions made with respect to an account within the bank. The Possible states for 
this field are: 
- Active: Normal customer interaction  
- Monitored: All interactions with the customer need to be monitored. 
 
Table 8 Assets: Personnel Authenticate Table 
 
Personnel- ID Password
P00126 James67Robins
 
The table is used to authenticate a bank employee when they login into the bank computer network, using 
the personnel ID and its associated password. 
 
Table 9 Asset: Operation Table 
 
Operation ID Table- Assets Operation on Assets Time- Frame
OP0001 Customer Details Customer (Mon- Fri= 0900-1700) (Sat = 0900-1230) 
OP0002 Personnel Details Bank HR (Mon- Fri= 0900-1700) 
OP0003 Transaction Details Bank Admin (Wed- Fri= 0900-1700) 
OP0004 Personnel Authenticate Bank HR (Mon- Fri= 0900-1700) 
OP0005 Security Log Bank security (Mon- Fri= 0900-1700) (Sat = 0900-1230) 
OP0006 Accounts Bank Manager (Mon- Wed= 0900-1700) 
 
This table is used to define operations on assets  
 
Table 10 Assets: Role Table 
 
Role- ID Operation- ID
R0001 OP0001 
 
This table is used to define operations on assets to specific roles.  
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Table 11 Assets: Personnel Table 
 
Personnel 
ID 
Role 
ID Name Address Telephone Location Status Date 
P00126 R0001 Stephen 121 Road 1112221 Waterloo Active 03/03/2012 
P00127 R0002 Ray 121 Road 1112222 Waterloo Retired 03/03/2012 
 
Table 12 Assets: Security Log Table 
 
Security ID Time  Stamp Location Type ID Activity 
S00150 03/02/2012 at 3:00pm Stratford Customer A10001 
Logged in Accounts 
table 
S00151 03/02/2012 at 3:00pm Waterloo Account A10002 Changed password 
 
3.2 Roles 
 
Figure 1:   Bank Hierarchy structure 
 
 
 
Table 13: Bank Roles 
 
In our analysis of the security issues with respect to the bank model, we have identified a number of key roles 
which must be taken into account. 
 
Role Description
Customer A customer is the one who has an account in the bank and is authorised to view 
personal details of his own transaction. 
Bank Manager • A bank manager is manager of a branch office of a bank. 
His/her main responsibilities are: 
• Implementing the delivery of sales strategies and targets and motivating 
employees to meet these. 
• Processing data to produce accurate facts, figures and reports; 
• Managing and supporting staff and facilitating appropriate continuing 
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professional development (CPD)
 
Bank Teller  • A bank teller is an employee of the bank who deals directly with most 
customers. 
His main responsibilities are; 
• Cashing cheques 
• Accepting deposits and loan payments 
• Handling foreign currencies or commercial or business accounts. 
Bank Security • Bank Security is responsible for the IT infrastructure of the bank 
Bank Operations • Bank operations are employees who ensure a smooth activity of work on a 
daily basis. 
• They are responsible for the verifications of customer’s details. 
Bank HR • Bank Human Resource is  responsible for recruiting new employee 
• Pay roll, appraisal etc. 
Bank Admin  • Bank admin is responsible for all the clerical work. 
• They will create all the accounts for the customers, as well as employee. 
• The will store essential records of customers in the database. 
• Mainly responsible for paperwork 
Non Customer A Non customer is one who does not have any rights or privileges to look into 
anyone’s account. He or she does not have an account with the bank and is only 
allowed to get public information. It may include the procedures to open a bank 
account, etc. 
  
3.3 Operation on Assets 
  
Table 14: Access Control Matrix 
 
Assets Role Customer_Authenticate Customer_Details Account _Holder 
Customer Authenticate, Change password View, Update View 
Bank Manager  View, Update, Change Status View 
Bank Teller   View View 
Bank Security Reset View, Change Status View 
Bank Operations    
Bank Admin  Create, Reset, Delete Create, Reset, View, update, Change status, Delete Delete, Append, View 
Bank HR    
Non Customer    
 
3.4 Operations on Assets for Access Control Matrix (ACM). 
 
Table 15   Asset: Customer Authenticate 
 
Assets Fields Customer ID = CACID; Password = CAPwd;
Operation Inputs Customer ID = ID; Password = PWD;
Operation  Authenticate
Description Authenticate a customer using their customer ID and password 
Precondition None
Event If (ID = CACID and Pwd = CAPwd) then customer authenticated 
Post event Security->Append(ID)
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4. Potential Threats to the System 
 
We have classified the threats as, internal threats and external threats. The internal threats emanates from 
someone working inside the bank, whereas the external threats emanates from an outside person. 
 
4.1 Internal threats: 
 
False Accounts:  The bank authorities might open false accounts in the names of fictitious customers and 
allow privileges to that account. They may provide such accounts with loans and credits. Later, they might 
convert this money to personal use. 
Fraudulent loans: One way to remove money from the bank is to take out a loan. A fraudulent loan 
however, is one in which the borrower is a business entity controlled by a dishonest bank officer or an 
accomplice; “the burrower” could then declares bankruptcy or vanishes. Eventually the money is gone. The 
borrower might even be a non-existing entity and the loan merely an artifice to conceal a theft of a large sum 
of money from the bank. 
Wire fraud: Wire transfer networks such as the international SWIFT interbank fund transfer are often 
targets because if a transfer is made, it is difficult or impossible to reverse. As these networks are used by 
banks to settle accounts with each other, rapid or overnight wire transfer of large amounts of money are 
commonplace; while banks have put checks and balances in place, there is the risk that the insiders may 
attempt to use fraudulent or forged documents which claim to request a bank depositor’s money be wired to 
another bank, often an offshore account in some distant foreign country.  
Forged or fraudulent documents:  Forged documents are often used to conceal other thefts. Banks 
tend to count their money meticulously, so every penny must be accounted for. A document claiming that a 
sum of money has been borrowed as a loan, withdrawn by an individual depositor or transferred or invested, 
can therefore  be valuable to a banker who wishes to conceal the minor detail, and assumed  that  the money  
has been stolen and is now gone. 
Theft of Identity:  Dishonest bank personnel have been known to disclose depositor’s personal 
information for use in theft of identity frauds. The perpetrators then use the information to obtain identity 
cards and credit cards, using the victim’s name and personal information. 
Demand Draft Fraud: This fraud is usually done by one or more of the bank’s dishonest employees. 
They remove few demand draft (DD) leaves or DD books from stock and write them like a regular DD. Since 
they are insiders they know the coding and punching of a demand draft. These Demand Drafts will be issued 
payable at a distant town/city without debiting an account, and will be cashed at the payable branch. For the 
paying branch it is just another Demand Draft. This kind of fraud will be discovered only when the head office 
does the branch- wise reconciliation, which normally takes 6 months. By that time the money is 
unrecoverable. 
External threats: These are the threats from outsiders, and can be done by thefts or hackers. 
Someone using the internet banking for transactions has to be careful of hackers. The security number and 
password are vital information for your online transaction. We have listed some of the threats below: 
Credit card Fraud: Typically the fraudster uses the credit card of another person to be charged for the 
purchase. Some of the credit card frauds are stolen card frauds, Account Takeover Fraud, Credit Card Mail 
Order Fraud, and Skimming. 
Stolen Credit card fraud: When a customer losses a card it is possible for the thief to make 
unauthorised payments on the card until the card is cancelled. 
Account Takeover Fraud: Fraudsters call and impersonate actual card holders using their stolen 
personal information. They have the address and other information of the card holder changed to an address 
they control. Additional cards and possibly PIN mailers are requested and issued to the new address and 
used by the fraudsters to make purchases or obtain cash advances. 
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Credit Card Mail Order Fraud: Using a stolen credit card number, or computer generated number, a 
thief will order stolen goods. 
Skimming: Skimming is the theft of credit card and information by a dishonest employee; it is usually 
done at bars or restaurants. These people either copy the numbers manually or they use a magnetic stripe 
reader to get the card security code. 
Phishing or fraudulent mail: Phishing is a fraud technique used to make people to give their security 
numbers and password to fraudsters. The hacker sends a fraudulent mail which is specifically designed to 
reveal the security details to the intended person. This mail is designed in such a way that it looks like it has 
come from a responsible source e.g; your bank. This mail might also provide you with a hyperlink with your 
bank home address URL which is again a fraud site. You might find this fake site exactly same as the original 
one where you can easily end up giving your security details to the hacker or fraudster. How phishing could 
be avoided is listed below: 
First of all, no bank will ever send a mail asking about your security number and password. If you do 
receive a mail from your bank, no matter how urgent it is never ever put security information on it. Always call 
the bank phone number to verify whether they want this information. Secondly, if you suspect that it is a fraud 
mail forward it to the bank reporting about this fraud. 
 Check the security Bank sites: You should never click on a hyperlink or follow a link to go to your 
bank home address on internet. Always type the whole address of your bank URL in the browser. Check 
whether the bank site starts with ‘https’ and whether there is a padlock icon at the bottom section of your 
browser. When you double click on the padlock icon it brings the information about the lock which will help 
you confirm whether this site is genuine. If the lock is not valid or has been issued to a website that you do 
not recognise, do not enter your security information. 
Login and Logout: Do not provide your security ID and password to anyone to avoid scams. Do not 
leave your computer or laptop unattended while you are still logged into your internet banking. Always logout 
when the session is over. Avoid saving the security ID and password on your computer and always keep it in 
a safe place. Also, do not change your security details when you are using a computer in a public place. 
 
5. Authentication 
 
5.1 Security policies 
 
A Security policy is a high level definition of a specific or set of behaviours, defining what is and what is not 
permitted with respect to the policy. It will correspond to a specific purpose within the bank’s security model. 
From   detailed study of our model, we have identified a number of specific security policies, which describe 
and relate to activities. They include: 
 
5.2 Authentication Policies 
 
Authentication is the process that is used to establish and confirm the identification of a valid entry. This 
identification allows for this entity to provide such information that their identity is no longer in doubt, allowing 
them to perform some authorised function or action. With the above statement in mind, in this section, we will 
discuss the different authentication tables we have identified above for our model, specifically in the asset 
section and the operations on the assets identified in the Access   Control Matrix, specifying their purpose, 
their inter-action and procedure. 
 
5.3 ‘Customer_Authentication’ Table 
 
This table is used to authenticate a customer who wants to access and manage his/her personal information 
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and overall account information over the internet. In order to do this, using a secure communication link, 
he/she will be asked to enter both his/her customer ID and password as proof of identity. This information is 
then compared using the ‘Authentication’ operation table; with the customer entered password encoded using 
that defined in the ‘password Security’ policy. The customer is allowed three failed attempts at the 
authentication process, before the ‘Failed Login Attempt’ policy is enforced and his/her  ‘Customer Details’ 
table entry marked as ‘Blocked’ and recorded in the ‘Security Log’ table. The bank will then contact the 
specific customer to inform him of this incident and investigate i.e., to find out if the customer forgot his/her 
password, or someone trying to impersonate him/her or an opportune hacker. 
In conclusion of this specific event, whether or not the bank security become involved due to a security 
violation, Bank admin gets the customer to activate it again so that he/she can manage the account again. In 
order to do this, the bank admin will perform the ‘Re-Authentication’ policy to authenticate the customer 
again, which on successful resolution  of this issue, the customer will be able to login again and manage 
his/her  account. 
 
5.4 ‘Account_Authentication’ Table 
 
This is the table to authenticate a customer attempting to manage a specific bank account held within the 
bank using an account card encoded with the account’s details. This access is usually in one of two ways; 
using an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) or from the front desk with a human tiller; both uses the 
‘Authentication’ operation policy. The use of the ATM requires the customer to go through an extra level of 
authentication, a personal identification number (PIN). This is the number originally assigned to the customer 
by the bank admin, and must be entered along with the account card. It is this information that is used by the 
‘Authentication’ operation table. 
The customer is allowed three failed  attempts at the authentication process at the ATM, before the 
‘Failed Login Attempt’ policy is enforced and the relevant account in the ‘Account’ table entry is marked 
‘Blocked’ and recorded in the ‘Security Log’ table. The bank admin will then contact the specific customer to 
inform him/her of this incident and thereafter investigate to see if there was any security implications i.e; was 
it the customer that  forgot  his/her  PIN or someone trying to impersonate them. 
At the end of the investigation, Bank security may or not be involved depending on the outcome, the 
bank admin will perform the ‘Re-Authentication’ policy in order to authenticate the customer, and 
subsequently make the account ‘Active’ again. The use of the front desk within the bank with the Tiller:  the 
customer here does not have his/her PIN to gain access to the account. Here, the only authentication is that 
the customer has the account card and seeks   for reasonable transactions on the account.  Apart from 
scrutiny to identify any unusual behaviour in the customer, there may be further identification from the 
customer by the Tiller, as well as the fact that the entire incident will be recorded on CCTV for potential 
analysis if something wrong is later identified. If the Tiller is unhappy or believes something is wrong,  he is  
able to mark that account as ‘Blocked’ and the incident recorded in the ‘security Log’ table. Bank admin will 
then request the customer to come into the bank for further talks, where the customer may have to go 
through the ‘Re-Authentication’ policy 
 
5.5 ‘Personnel_Authentication’ Table 
 
This is the table used to authenticate bank employees so that they can carry out their employment objectives 
and interact with the equipment within the bank’s network. Here employees will have to prove their identity in 
two different ways. The first request is to ask them  to enter their personnel ID and password as proof of 
identity,  and is eventually compared with information in the  ‘Authentication’ operation  table, using the 
entered password encoded  in the ‘Password security Policy’. The employee is allowed three attempts in one 
day during  the authentication process, before the ‘Failed login Attempt’ policy is enforced and   his/her  
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‘personnel’ table entry is marked as ‘Blocked’. It is then up to the employee to contact the bank security and 
request for a reset of his/her password, while the ‘Personnel’ table entry is made ‘Active’ again. Bank 
Security will undertake the ‘Re –Authentication’ policy with the employee, and if successful it re-enables that 
employee’s login. The second authentication way is more of a visual approach, in that the employee must 
display his/her personnel ID card. This will enable other members of the bank to have some idea   with 
respect to internal bank information.  
 
6. Authorization 
 
Authorisation will always follow after successful authentication. Authorisation is the process of allowing an 
authenticated person, to access a function or action that is allowed to do. It is the access control, the 
guardian, who performs this function. In the bank model, I have identified a number of specific roles which 
have specific functions or operations associated with them. These roles have been defined in the ‘Roles’ 
table, each being made up of a number of operations  which have been defined in the ‘operations’ table in 
order to achieve the role’s functionality. These roles cover both the employees of the bank and its customers.  
It is a declaration of the activities both can perform on bank assets. The main difference between employees 
and customer’s roles is that all customers have the same default role of a ‘Customer’ and its associated 
operations. Whilst employees cannot be pigeon holed into a single role, they can be spread over many roles, 
each with a number of common and unique operations associated to him/her. Note that in the design of our 
authorisation process, we have added a dynamic capability to its planning and operation. This means if an 
operation is changed or if a role requires a new operation, this can be implemented very easily with 
immediate effect. This entire process of authorisation can be seen quite clearly in the ‘Access Control Matrix, 
where operations on assets can be clearly identified to specific roles. One additional important facility 
associated with this authorisation process, is the ability for each operation to have a ‘Time-Frame’ component 
associated with it. This means that even though an operation can be carried out by a specific role, it must 
also meet the criteria of the timing element. It adds a little more control over when an operation can be 
started. 
 
7. Confidentiality  
 
In this section, we will argue about the generic principle of data protection procedure and its importance in 
connection with the bank model we have designed. Confidentiality is about ensuring that information is 
accessible only to those authorised to have access. Confidentiality is one of the keystones of “data protection 
or information security”. Confidentiality is one of the design goals for many Cryptosystems made possible in 
practice by the techniques of modern cryptography. 
 
7.1 Types of Confidentiality 
 
Client Confidentiality:  In relation to the bank Model  we have designed, client confidentiality is the principle 
that have been implemented and  suggest that the bank (as an institution or employees), should not reveal 
information about their clients both at individual level or otherwise, to a third party without the consent of the 
client or a clear legal reason. 
Bank secrecy or Bank Privacy:  With regard to the Bank Model developed above, we have 
introduced Bank privacy, which implies legal principle under which banks are allowed to protect personal 
information about their customers.  
Introducing Access Control Matrix for data protection:  Access Control Matrix is an abstract, formal 
security model introduced in the bank model that characterises the right of each subject with respect to every 
object in the system. It is a scheme through which we have specified and enforced security policies (what is 
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to be secured for a system of the Bank and its’ entity). It also addresses the constraints on behaviour of its 
members and constraints imposed on adversaries by the help of mechanism developed in the bank model, 
which means the system controls on functions and flows amongst them, including external system and 
adversaries, and access to customer data by internal people.  Therefore, we have designed the authorisation 
as been granted on the basis of role hierarchy, which defines the degree of access to any objects. 
 
8. Integrity 
 
In this section of the bank model, we will discuss about data (Bank Assets/Services) and information being 
provided against any data for the purpose of getting access. The degree of accuracy on information provided 
against the data will be the source to create authentic data integrity. Integrity is an assurance of data non- 
alteration. Data integrity is having assurance that the information has not been altered in transmission from 
origin to reception. 
 
8.1 Data Integrity assurance in Bank Model 
 
An application or mechanism was introduced into the security systems to ensure that there is data integrity in 
the bank model. This section concerns about cryptographic signature, which includes digital signature or 
digital signature scheme. 
 
Table 16: Table of Implementation procedure of mechanism 
 
1. Mechanism  type • Asymmetric cryptography 
2. Property of mechanism • Signature in digital rather than in written form 
3. Digital signature scheme gives  two 
algorithms 
• One for signing user’s secrets or Private Key 
• One for verifying Public signature 
4. Purpose of mechanism • Authentication (verification of user’s identity) 
5. Process of authentication • Through electronic mail to contact (sending, storing and receiving 
message over electronic communication system). 
6. Contents  of electronic mail • Customer – ID 
• Customer – Password 
• Pin No. 
• Personal –ID (when login – out) 
• Pre-arranged questions etc. 
7. Use of digital signature • To create public key infrastructures 
8. How does PKI work? • It works with the help of public key encryption (a message 
encrypted onto a user’s public key cannot be decrypted by another 
one, except the user possessing corresponding private key). 
9. How a user is joined with PKI system • By digital identifying certificate issued by certificate authority. 
 
9. Availability 
 
In this section of the bank model, we will discuss how to obtain availability and accessibility of information or 
resources. This section also contains a discussion on some factors that causes resources to become less 
available than required or not available at all. Availability is assurance to timely and reliable access to data 
services for authorized users. It ensures that the information or resources are available when required. It 
implies that the resources are available at a rate, which is fast enough for the wider system to perform its task 
as intended by the bank customer’s satisfaction. But there are still some constraints we considered in the 
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bank model which can cause delay and unavailability of resources or services. Factors that we have outlined 
in the bank model which could lead to unavailability of resources are as follow: 
In relation to the bank model developed above, confidentiality and integrity were built-in to protect the 
system. However, a third party e.g. an attacker or a hacker can make the bank resources and services least 
and sometime unavailable 
 
Table 17: Polices introduced in the Bank Model 
 
1. Identification and awareness  of 
computer crime in relation to 
individual and secrete  data 
• E.g. Illegal access: [unauthorised access]. 
• Illegal interception: [by means of non-public transmission of 
computer data to, from or within the computer system]. 
• Data interface: [unauthorised damaging, deletion, deterioration 
and altering or suppressing computer data]. 
• Misuses of devices: [forgery, ID-theft]. 
• Electronic fraud 
2. Identification of access factor • Customer –ID. 
• Account – ID 
• Account –PIN 
• Customer Password. 
• Prearranged Questions for security check etc. 
3. Use of the identification factors • Access will be granted upon if insertion of PIN or Password 
was done within standard time frame and procedure. Else 
• If until third time pin number or password use is not correct 
then the access factor and account will be locked for security 
check 
4. Eventually, assuming that it could be 
due to computer security reason 
caused by the hacker 
• DOS attack [Denial of service] will take place to make sure 
resources are unavailable for intended users. 
 
10. Auditing 
 
In this section of the bank model, we will discuss about identifying the who, where and when,  with respect to 
information access  carried out, which as a record remains recorded in a chronological order in the security 
Log system of the bank.  In addition, we will also discuss about the computer – generated records and the 
process of creating such record called data logging. Auditing in relation to the bank model (data, access, 
communication, transaction etc.) is a chronological sequence of audits records, each of which contains 
evidence directly linked to, and resulting from the execution of business process or system function into the 
security log system of the bank.  In order words, an audit records from activities such as transactions, 
communication by individual, people, systems, accounts or entities. 
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Table 18: Function of auditing in relation to the bank  
 
By whom  Activities Result 
Bank 
Manager 
• View Customer details 
• Update, Change Status 
• All the activities carried  out will be recorded 
in the bank security log with time in and out 
in chronological order 
Customer • Change of password. 
• Viewing balance and carrying 
out Dr Transaction. 
• All the activities carried out by the manager 
will be recorded in the bank security log with 
time in and out in chronological order. 
Third Party 
[Hacker] 
• Impersonate the details of 
customer 
• The activity will be recorded and log system 
will not authenticate in the absence of 
accurate identification. 
 
Any individual bank employee or customer carrying out any activity relating to authorization, authentication 
for any purpose will be automatically recorded in the security log system. The data recorded in the security 
log can be found in chronological order, which enable us to find out when a particular activity was carried out. 
It can be enabled to reconstruct and examine the starter/end of data, and can also reconstruct the 
intermediate states the data went through before the final state was established 
 
11. Detection and Reaction 
 
Detection is the ability to identify some trends, patterns or activities hidden or excluded within the normal 
operating flow of the system, which should not be there. The goal is to do this as close to real-time as 
possible, and to limit damage and exposure. Reaction is the activity that will follow the detection of an 
abnormal event and there is a procedure in place to deal with such occurrences. Most detection would 
probably come from customer noticing abnormal activities on his/her account, usually via transactions made 
on them. At this point the bank will carry out investigation, if not ‘Blocking’ but certainly ‘Monitoring’ the 
account and subsequent transactions for clues or trial in order to trace the culprit(s).Usually, the bank does 
have a wide range of tools it can use to help in its  detection process, which includes: 
Intruder Detection System: *Software which monitors network traffic for patterns and certain types of 
behaviour. 
Trend analysis and Data Mining:  Constantly analysing customers’ activities, identifying their habits 
and forming a classification of their type; watching for when this classification drastically alters, and then 
investigating the change to see if any action is required. 
False application:  New applications from customers are investigated to see if their details are correct 
(address is registered with council, name is registered to address, etc) and that they exist and have a credit 
value. 
  
11.1 Detection and Reaction by the system 
 
The sort of ‘Detection and Reaction’ events we could foresee in our model’s assets are as follow: 
 
11.1.1 ‘Customer_Authentication’ / ‘Account-Authentication’ Table 
 
Detection: Repeated attempts to login and failure to a customer account. Perhaps an attempt to permanently 
block a customer’s account, a form of Denial of Service (DOS) 
Reaction: ‘Monitor’ account, if not blocked; Detailed investigation of events. 
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11.1.2 ‘Customer_Authentication’ / ‘Account-Authentication’ Table 
 
Detection: Account logged in twice at the same time at different IP addresses  
Reaction: ‘Block’ account; detailed investigation of events; and inform the customer. 
 
11.1.3 ‘Customer_Authentication’ / ‘Account-Authentication’ Table 
 
Detection: An attempt using IP address from a foreign site to login to as a customer’s account. 
Reaction: ‘Monitor’ account; investigate IP; and inform the customer. 
 
11.1.4 ‘Customer_Authentication’ / ‘Account-Authentication’ Table 
 
Detection: Unusual hours of accessing account from the norm 
Reaction: ‘Monitor’ account; investigate IP; and inform the customer. 
 
11.1.5 ‘Account, / ‘Transaction’ Table 
 
Detection: Unusual account activities from the norm, lots of debits, high values 
Reaction: ‘Monitor’ account, possibly ‘Blocking’ if high values are recorded, investigate IP; and inform 
the customer. 
 
11.1.6 ‘Personnel_Auhentication; Table 
 
Detection: Account logged in twice at the same time at a difference IP address  
Reaction:  ‘Block’ account; detailed information/investigation of events follows. 
 
11.1.7 ‘Operation’ Table 
 
Detection: An employee attempting to run an outside operation beyond its ‘Time-Frame’ 
Reaction: ‘Monitor account; disallow operation; investigate event. 
 
12. Concluding   Remark 
 
By and large, the need for effective and efficient security system in the banking industry cannot be 
overemphasised, in order to guarantee confidence amongst clients and other users. Although, the desire to 
protect security systems is increasingly difficult because of the fact that hackers are becoming more skilful 
due to sophisticated attack technologies available. Therefore, eliminating all kinds of threats to the security 
systems is one of the bank’s foremost challenges. Apart from being a moral imperative, it is also an essential 
step in reducing crisis in the banking industry. As long as large numbers of users are faced with frequent 
threats occasioned from instability of the present security system, the response to opportunities for the bank 
to create confidence amongst clients/users is bound to be muted, and little progress would be made in the 
fight against threats to security systems. But reducing potential threats to security systems  is not an 
exorbitant endeavour as it is achievable to a large extent through this bank model designed above, which 
combine measures for dealing with Information security problems,  coupled with  investments in security 
systems.  
The lesson to be learnt is that challenges to security systems cannot be eliminated without first 
ensuring that the security systems in the banks are markedly secure. This can be achieved through the 
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reversal of the declining trend in investments in security systems.  Only with dynamic security system would 
there be any hope of dealing with the problems associated to the system.  
Common sense is always the voice of reason and in the Bank’s case, the deadlock over frequent or failure in 
security systems need to be broken for the users in the society to enjoy the benefits of doing business with 
the banking industry. 
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